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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
PACIFIC STATES CAST IRON PIPE 
COMPANY, 
and 
ALYIN T. LOCKE, 
Plaintiff, 
Intervening Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
HARSH UTAH CORPORATION, a cor-
poration, HARSH INVESTMENT COR-
PORATION, a corporation, and HAROLD 
J. SCHNITZER, an individual, 
Defendants and Appellants. f 
Case No. 
8336 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Throughout this reply brief, appellants, Harsh Utah 
Corporation, Harsh Investment Corporation and Harold 
J. Schnitzer, will be referred to either by name or as 
defendants and respondent, Alvin T. Locke, will be re-
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£erred to as plaintiff or by name. Other parties to the 
action who have appeared from time to time but are 
no longer before this court will be referred to by the name 
of the party. 
All italics are ours. 
This reply brief is made necessary by the fact that 
there are many misstatements concerning the record and 
the proper inferences that may be drawn from testimony 
quoted in the brief of respondent. It is also necessary 
since in the brief of respondent, he is making claim to 
additional sums by way of a cross appeal. Damages are 
claimed to have been the result of inadequate financing of 
the Hill Field Housing Project. Defendants will not 
restate the facts for in their original brief a full and 
complete statement is made. However, it is not to ba 
believed that by not stating again the facts in this 
reply brief defendants in any way are accepting the facts 
as set forth in the brief of plaintiff. As a matter of fact, 
defendants have discovered in the statement of facts 
and throughout the brief of the plaintiff a great num-
ber of inaccurate and false statements. These inaccu-
rate and false statements refer primarily to the effect 
or inference which can properly be drawn from specific 
testimony which is set forth in the brief of plaintiff. 
Defendants state to the Court that it cannot accept on 
their. face the references by plaintiff to the various sec-
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tions of different witnesses' testimonies. The court 
must examine carefully those portions of the testimony 
to which the plaintiff refers for in many instances the 
referred to testimony does in no way support or justify 
the claim which is made for the testimony by plaintiff. 
Throughout defendants' reply brief, reference will 
be made to the appendix of defendants' main brief on 
appeal and also to the appendix of the respondent's brief. 
In addition, defendants will attach to this brief an ap-
pendix setting forth an additional exhibit which the de-
fendants feel is material and repeated references will 
be necessitated to said appendix material. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE BASIC DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN DEFEND-
ANTS AND THE PLAINTIFF IS, WHAT .COSTS DID THE 
PARTIES INTEND TO CONSIDER BEFORE A PROFIT 
COULD BE CALCULATED OUT OF WHICH A BONUS 
COULD BE PAID. 
POINT II. 
WHAT ITEMS OF INCOME WERE INTENDED BY THE 
PARTIES TO BE ·CONSIDERED IN CALCULATING THE 
PROFITS OR AS A BASIS FOR A BONUS. 
POINT III. 
THE HILL FIELD WHERRY HOUSING PROJECT WAS 
ADEQUATELY, COMPLETELY AND FULLY FINANCED 
BY HAROLD J. SCHNITZER. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
'THE BASIC DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN DEFEND-
ANTS AND THE PLAINTIFF IS, WHAT ·COSTS DID THE 
PARTIES INTEND TO CONSIDER BEFORE A PROFIT 
COULD BE CALCULATED OUT OF WHICH A BONUS 
COULD BE PAID. 
Defendants would like it clearly understood that 
they do not contend that there is not, in the parlance of 
accounting work, a definite distinction between direct 
construction costs and costs not directly connected with 
the actual construction work being carried forward. The 
indirect costs include all of the expenses of financing a 
project and the overhead which is incurred in super-
visory and 1nanagement expense. The accountant for 
plaintiff was correct in testifying that there is a dif-
ference between "construction costs" and "project costs." 
The fundamental difference that exists concerns 
the interpretation of the October 4th agreement. Under 
the terms of that agreement did the parties Schnitzer 
and Locke have in mind distinguishing between "con-
struction costs" and "project costs" or were they talking 
about the total costs of constructing the project upon 
which bids had been submitted. 
Defendants believed that the October 4th agreement 
can stand only one logical interpretation and construc-
tion which is that when the parties discussed costs in 
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connection with construction of a housing project, they 
were talking .about all of the costs that would reason-
ably be incurred. 
The background for the preparation of the October 
4th agreement and the circumstances surrounding its 
preparation were properly received to place the con-
tract in a setting which would give the court a definite 
insight into the meaning of the terms used. However, 
when all of the background material is in and the setting 
of the contract is before the court, the fundamental ques-
tion of the meaning of the contract is a question of law. 
Throughout the history of the common law in Oregon 
and in the State of Utah, the meaning of a contract and 
the language used therein, has always been a question 
of law. On legal propositions, this court has full scope 
of review. 
This court should determine anew the legal effect 
of the October 4th agreement. It should establish the 
various rights, duties and liabilities of the parties after 
determining the meaning of the agreement. 
In determining the meaning and legal effect of a 
contract no evidence either expert or otherwise could be 
received from any source. A legal document such as 
the October 4th agreement is a subject upon which judges 
are the highest authorities and are the 1nost acceptable 
experts. No evidence or opinion is acceptable or could 
be received to set forth the effect of the language con-
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tained in a legal document: See: W. H. Walker v. J. TV. 
McLoud, 204 F .S. 302, 51 L. Ed. 495, 27 S. Ct. 293; I daJlw 
Forwarding Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 8 Utah 41; 
29 Pac. 826; Gardine v. Cottey, 360 Mo. 681, 230 S.W. 
( 2d) 731, 20 Am. J ur. 672, 18 A.L.R. ( 2d) 1100. 
This particular concept is important for the only 
evidence there is in the record concerning the distinc-
tion between "construction costs" and "project costs" 
comes from the certified public accountant employed by 
plaintiff, one Goldberg. 
Goldberg's testimony that there was and is a dis-
tinction between "construction costs" and "project costs" 
was not specifically applied to the October 4th agree-
ment. By innuendo and inference, it would appear that 
the plaintiff requests this court to accept the Goldberg 
distinction between "construction costs" and "project 
costs" as being a distinction which the parties had in 
mind in the preparation of the October 4th agreement. 
Neither the phrase "construction costs" nor "project 
costs" was used by the parties in the contract. Defendants 
submit that all of the conduct of the parties, 
all of the language of the agreement, all of the legal 
principles and common sense, indicates beyond doubt 
that the parties to the October 4th agreement were talk-
ing about the total costs of constructing the Wherry 
Housing Projects. 
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Throughout the record there is not one act of either 
party which is inconsistent with the idea that all costs 
were to be considered before any profit or bonus was 
to be calculated. 
The basic figures on which the bonuses were to be 
calculated was .a figure which the constructing corpora-
tion was in no way concerned with. It was the bid figure 
accepted by the government. The bid figure accepted by 
the government was only the concern of the sponsor-
ing corporation. 
The testimony of all the parties show that prior to 
the acceptance of the bids and prior to the organization 
of the Harsh Utah Corporation, plaintiff received from 
Schnitzer personally his $1,000 per month pay check and 
at no time did he consider that he was other than an 
employee of Harold J. Schnitzer. Under oath plaintiff 
has stated he considered himself an employee of Schnit-
zer. Schnitzer was always concerned with all costs since 
in the final analysis he had to pay all of the costs. 
It would seem to be an established principle of law 
from which there is no dissent that the construction and 
interpretation of a contract that is in writing, clear, 
unambiguous and uncertain in its terms is a strict ques-
tion of law for the court to decide. The appellate court 
has the unrestricted right to review and determine the 
correctness of the leg.al solution which the trial court 
decreed. 
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This principle has been clearly set forth in the ra~rs 
from Oregon where the contract of October -t, 1951, was 
drawn. They hold that the interpretation of a written in-
strument is a matter of'law. 
In Henry v. Harker, 61 Ore. 276, 122 Pac. 298, the 
Supreme Court of Oregon had a situation before it 
where a party made an attempt to vary and change the 
terms of a written instrument by evidence of an oral 
modification. In setting forth the principle which de-
fendants seek to apply to the October 4th contract, the 
court there stated (p. 299): 
"It is claime{l that this contract is ambiguous, 
and that, therefbre, its construction is left as a 
question of fact, and that, the court sitting as a 
jury having found the fact for the plaintiff, such 
finding is conclusive upon this court. The con-
struction of a contract is always a matter of law 
for the court. If technical words or terms of art 
or local phrases not in common use are introduced, 
or if it is uncertain to what person or what thing 
.a writing refers, oral evidence may be introduced 
to explain the language used, or if the language 
itself is not clear, and it can be shown that both 
parties placed a particular interpretation upon it 
and acted upon that interpretation, evidence show-
ing such interpretation may be admitted. But 
when, as in this case, the contract consists wholly 
of a writing or series of writings all admitted to 
be genuine and containing no technical terms, the 
construction of the writings becomes a matter of 
pure law for the court. Hutchinson v. Bowler, 5 
M. & W. 535; Goddard v. Foster, 17 Wall. 123, 21 
L. Ed. 589. And this rule is even applied to oral 
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contracts where their terms are not disputed. 
Globe Works v. vVright, 106 Mass. 207; American 
Towing & L. Co. v. Baker-Whitely Coal Co., 111 
Md. 504, 75 Atl. 341." 
The Oregon Supreme Court had another occasion 
at a later date to restate and apply the principle that a 
written instrument is to be interpreted and construed 
.as a matter of lav;r. In Rose v. U.S. Lnmber & Box Co., 
107 Ore. 513, 215 Pac. 171, the defendant and plaintiff 
were attempting to give great stress to oral statements 
concerning the terms and conditions of the contract which 
the court was interpreting. The Oregon Supreme Court 
explained the rule and the language there, which de-
fendant respectfully submits is applicable to the pre-
sent case (p. 17 4) : 
"::\Inch stress was laid in argument by the 
defendant on some· testimony given by the plain-
tiff, where he said in substance, that he never 
agreed to deliver any fixed quantity of lumber 
per month under this contract. The contention of 
the defendant is that this amounted to a construc-
tion of the contract by the plaintiff himself in a 
way that disclosed its want of mutuality. The 
argument is fallacious. True it is that the con-
tract itself does not specify any particular num-
ber of feet of lumber to be delivered per month. 
The measure of the quantity to he delivered is 
the output of the mill resulting from a continuous 
run. What that might amount to probably would 
vary, so that the plaintiff was justified in say-
ing that no particular amount per month was 
agreed upon. The contract being in writing, its 
construction is a question of law for the court, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
with the result, in this instance, that the contract 
is plainly one containing mutual covenants of the 
parties, one being the consideration for the other." 
The latest authority which comes out of the State 
of Oregon and succinctly sets forth the principle which 
defendants request be applied to the contract before this 
court, is Columbia Digger Sand & Gravel Co. v. Ross 
Island Sand & Gravel Co., 145 Ore. 96, 25 P. 2d 911. The 
Oregon Supreme Court there stated the rule of law in 
the following language (p. 916): 
"Defendant predicates error upon the charge 
of the court leaving the question to the jury as 
to whether this Readymix was within the contract 
for the reason that it leaves the construction of 
the contract to the jury and not to the court. The 
construction of a written contract is for the court, 
and should not devolve upon the jury. Section 
9-214, Oregon Code 1930; Henry v. Harker, 61 Or. 
276, 118 P. 205, 122 P. 298; City of Seaside v. 
Randles, 92 Or. 650, 180 P. 319; Rose v. U. S. 
Lbr. & Box Co., 108 Or. 237, 215 P. 171; Wallace 
v. American Life Ins. Co., 111 Or. 510, 225 P. 192, 
227 P. 465." 
This court has had occasions very recently to pass 
upon the rules covering the duties of the finder of the 
fact and the court in determining the meaning of the 
language of a written instrument. Mathis v. Madsen, 
1 Utah 2d 46, 261 P. 2d 952, concerned a contract which 
all of the court conceded was .ambiguous and uncertain 
in its terms. The court applying the rule that the mean-
ing and interpretation of a contract is a question of law 
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set forth the principles .applicable, even if it were con-
ceded as defendant does not concede that the October 
4th agreement is ambiguous and uncertain in its terms 
(p. 52) : 
" * * * That fact alone, however, does not 
relieve the Court (nor this Court) of its re-
sponsibility to ascertain its meaning if that can 
be done under the provisions of law respecting 
this type of instrument. In searching for the 
meaning the Court must first examine the lan-
guage used in the instrument itself and accord to 
it the weight and effect which the instrument itself 
may show that the parties intended the words to 
have. If then its meaning is still ambiguous or 
uncertain, the Court may consider other con-
temporaneous writing concerning the same subject 
matter, and may, if it is still uncertain, consider 
parole evidence of the parties' intention. See 
Burt v. Stringfellow, 45 Utah 207, 143 P. 234; 
Beagley v. United States Gypsum Co., Utah, 235 
P. 2d 783." 
The holding in the JJ1 at his case has apparently al-
ways been the law of the State of Utah. In Armstrong 
v. Larsen, 55 Utah 347, 186 Pac. 97, the principle was 
set down in the following language (p. 98): 
"The terms of the written contract .are neither 
ambiguous nor uncertain. It was therefore the 
duty of the court to construe the contract and 
advise the jury of the respective rights of the 
parties thereunder. The request embodied a cor-
rect interpretation of the contract. It was the 
duty of the court to give that or similar instruc-
tions. The failure to do so, in our judgment, con-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
stituted prejudical error. B.ank v. Peterson, 33 
Utah 209, 93 Pac. 566, 126 Am. St. Rep. 817; 
Lowry v. ~1egee, 52 Ind. 107; Kamphouse v. Gaff. 
ner, 73 Ill. 453; Gage v. Meyers, 59 Mich. 300, 26 
N. W. 522." 
Additional cases which clearly show that the prin-
ciple of law under our Utah decisions and under the 
decisions of the State of Oregon are the san1e as Bailey 
v. Spalding-Livingston Investment Go., 43 Utah 535, 136 
Pac. 962, and Penn Star JJ1ining Co. v. Lyman, G-± Utah 
343, 231 Pac. 107. 
POINT II. 
WHAT ITEMS OF INCOME WERE INTENDED BY THE 
PARTIES 'TO BE ·CONSIDERED IN CALCULATING THE 
PROFITS OR AS A BASIS FOR A BONUS. 
(a) Rental Income from Harsh Utah Corporation 
was Improperly Included in Calculations of the Bonu:J 
to Locke. 
An additional difference in interpretation of the 
October 4th agreement by plaintiff and defendants arises 
out of the inclusion of the net rental, which was received 
by Harsh Utah after Harsh Investment was through 
with the construction phase, in the mnounts which are 
to be denominated income. 
The trial court included in the income of the Harsh 
Investment the rental income which Harsh Utah had 
actually received. It held that this income was properly 
a construction income under the contract of October 4th. 
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The subject matter of rental income and interest in the 
ownership and management of the Project after con-
struction was covered specifically. See appendix of de-
fendants' brief, at page 10, second paragraph. It is there 
set forth specifically that Locke shall have no interest 
in and to the ownership or management of the projects 
mentioned or in connection with any profits that may be 
derived therefrom. The language is clear that the interest 
of Locke would be 1imited to the construction of the pro-
jeds. 
The basic concept upon which plaintiff attempts 
to claim an interest in the rental income seems to be a 
twofold proposition. First, he claims that he is entitled 
to participate in the rental income by reason of the fact 
that the project was finished in less time than the maxi-
mum permitted under the agreement with the Air Force 
and F.H.A. He claims the remaining months which were 
allowed should be considered as a construction period 
and any income earned should be alloted to the Harsh 
Investment. Second, plaintiff claims a right to have 
rental income alloted to him by re.ason of an oral agree-
ment between himself and Schnitzer that income from 
rentals during the 24-month period of construction should 
be included in computing his bonus. 
Apparently plaintiff is of the opinion that he can 
on the basis of his testimony alone show an oral modifi-
cation of a written instrument. At page 61 of respond-
ent's brief, there is cited for the court the proposition 
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of the oral modification of .a written instrument and the 
record is referred to substantiate the claim. The record 
reference is T. 42M-45M 797. 
The referred to testimony of Locke indicates that on 
an occasion, when he and Schnitzer were riding on the 
train to Great Falls, Montana, Schnitzer requested that 
the employees at the Gre.at Falls Project be placed on an 
overtime schedule and at that time in discussing the 
Great Falls project, Locke claims that Schnitzer agreed 
that rental income on the Great Falls project would be 
included in determining whether or not there was any 
profit from the construction of the project. Again when 
Schnitzer and Locke were returning from W .ashington, 
D.C. in 1953 and it appeared that the costs of the Mon-
tana project were very close to the amount of funds avail-
able to construct the project, Locke again states that 
Schnitzer agreed that the rental income on the Great 
F.alls Montana job would be included in income for deter-
mining whether or not there was any bonus from the 
construction of the Great Falls job. 
Plaintiff's attorney attempted to get from his client 
a statement that these conversations which he refers to 
also pertained to the Hill Field Project in Utah but failed. 
It is submitted that even if this court accepts the propo-
sition (which it cannot) that specific terms of .a written 
instrument may be varied by an oral agreement made in 
informal conversation, still the oral agreement referred 
to did not concern in any way the Hill Field project but 
concerned only the Great Falls Project in Montana. 
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Under the case law both in Utah and Oregon an oral 
modification of a written instrument must be executed 
for consideration or shown by clear, convincing and con-
clusive evidence. Craswell v. Biggs, 160 Or. 547, 86 P. 2d 
71; Mawhinney v. Jensen (Utah) 232 P. 2d 769; Bamber-
ger Co. v. Certified Productions, Inc., 88 Utah 194, 48 P. 
(2d) 489. 
This oral .agreement which plaintiff is claiming 
exists between Schnitzer, the individual, and Locke. 
At no place does plaintiff claim that Harsh Investment 
agreed with Locke that he would be paid a bonus based 
on rental income which Harsh Utah earned at Hill 
Field. At no place in the record is there a clearer demon-
stration of the concept which defendants have of the re-
lationship which existed between the two corporations, 
Harsh Utah, Harsh Investment and Schnitzer than in this 
recitation by the plaintiff concerning rental income. 
All of the parties to the October 4th agreement under-
stood that Harsh Utah and Harsh Investment and the 
various other corporations which were organized by 
Schnitzer were the means to an end. The end was the 
construction of certain Vfherry I-Iousing Projects. What 
the parties had in mind w.as not a profit to various seg-
ments or individual units in the group of instruments 
but a profit for the overall project and a profit to Schnit-
zer. 
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The basic inconsistency in plaintiff's arguments is 
demonstrated by the proposition that an oral modifica-
tion can be effective between Schnitzer and Locke on the 
J\1:ont.ana project and without more made applicable to the 
Utah project. The inconsistency permeates the whole 
argument of the plaintiff in his brief and in his presenta-
tion before the trial court. He, on one hand, must keep 
Harsh Utah separate from Harsh Investment and on the 
other, show Schnitzer as the personification of all corpo-
rations. 
(b) The Change Order Extras Amount was Im-
properly Calculated. 
At pages 56 and 57 of his brief, plaintiff makes refer-
ence to the fact that certain changes in the work to be 
done at Hill Field were made and requests for extras 
were made to compensate Harsh Utah for the extra 
work anticipated. 
Plaintiff quotes Article XV covering changes in 
work. I-Ie then attempts to show that there was an agree-
ment between Harsh Utah and Harsh Investment con-
cerning the amount which Harsh Utah would pay 
Harsh Investment for the changes in the construction that 
was accomplished by Harsh Investment. 
There is no showing whatsoever of any agreement 
ever having been 1nade. There is no evidence of any dis-
cussion between Locke and Schnitzer or anyone else in the 
management of Harsh Utah and Harsh Invest-
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ment concerning the amount of money Harsh Utah would 
have to pay or be obligated to pay Harsh Investment 
for the changes. In fact counsel for plaintiff in his trial 
brief stated : -- :':~~~iJ 
"Only contract between HARSH UTAH COR-
PORATION as owner .and HARSH INVEST-
::1\.fENT CORPORATION as contractor, concern-
ing amount to be paid to HARSH INVESTTh.fENT 
CORPORATION was 'CONSTRUCTION CON-
TRACT'- 'LUMP SUM' (Ex. #61), wherein, pur-
suant to 'ARTICLE 3-THE CONTRACT SUM' 
-'The owner shall pay the contractor for the per-
formance of the contract, subject to additions and 
deductions provided herein, on account of con-
struction the sum of $2,995,205.00 cash.' There is 
absolutely no evidence of any other agreement be-
tween owner .and contractor and absolutely no evi-
dence, oral or written, varying this contract price." 
In an attempt to show that there was an agree-
ment between Harsh Utah and Harsh Investment for 
the payment for change extras, defendant cites the testi-
mony of the witness Hutchinson and quotes a portion of 
that testimony at appendix page 16. The quoted testi-
mony in no way supports a finding that Hutchinson, 
Harsh Utah or Harsh Investment had entered into any 
kind of an agreement concerning the amount to be paid 
by Harsh Utah to Harsh Investment for extras. 
Plaintiff then attempts to show by an F.H.A. offi-
cial that the change requests that were submitted con-
stituted a contract between Harsh Utah and Harsh 
Investment. Plaintiff cites appendix page 27 to 29 to 
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support this assertion. Even assuming that the F.H.A. 
official may have some helpful interpretation of the 
change request, that interpretation would in no way be 
binding upon either Harsh Utah or Harsh Investment. 
But the testimony quoted by plaintiff at appendix page 
27 to 29 fails to support in any way the claim and in no 
way indicates that the change request constituted a con-
tract between Harsh Utah and Harsh Investment. 
Not satisfied with the testimony of Warwick or 
Hutchinson as quoted at page 16 and appendix pages 
27 and 29, plaintiff attempted to show that the witness 
Isaacson, the inspector on the Wherry Housing Project 
at Hill Field interpreted the change request to mean 
that Harsh Utah was agreeing to pay Harsh Investment 
the amount of the requested change. Plaintiff quotes 
Is.aacson's testimony at the appendix pages 30 to 32. 
Not one word of what Isaacson said indicated in any way 
that he or Harsh Utah or Harsh Investment ever thought 
that the change request fixed the amount Harsh Utah had 
agreed to p.ay Harsh Investment. Most of the change 
requests were only estimates of extra costs. Many were 
completely disallowed. Some were allowed in part and 
disallowed in part because of technical rules of the F.H.A. 
No one could predict the amounts which would ultimately 
be approved and allowed. At the time of trial no one 
even knew the final amount because no final approval 
by the F.H.A. had been granted. 
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This particular aspect of the plaintiff's case is ex-
tremely important to him. Without it over half of his 
claimed bonus is lost. Only by increasing the lump sum 
contract amount above the lump sum is it possible for 
plaintiff to claim a bonus. If plaintiff is required to look 
solely to Harsh Investment and its construction receipts 
for his bonus, none will be available. 
The extent to which Locke was to participate in the 
changes in the increased allowance as F.H.A. adjustments 
is a matter specifically covered by the October 4th agree-
ment. The following is the applicable language: 
"* * *Locke shall receive .a sum equal to ten per 
cent (10%) of all net profits received by Harsh 
as F .H.A. adjustments, the same being additional 
compensation to Harsh for changes in plans and 
specifications, or increased labor costs, from the 
United States Government for the construction 
of said projects, or any of them, over and above 
the profits involved in the original bids of Harsh 
accepted by the Government." 
No attempt has ever been made to ascertain whether 
profit was actually made on work accomplished .as 
changes in plans or specifications or increased labor 
costs. It is clear, however, that only the amounts actually 
received as mortgage increases was to enter into the 
calculations, then only 10o/o of "net profits." The trial 
court added the full amount of the requested changes as 
estimated in his final judgment and then gave Locke 50o/o 
of the amount after giving defendant the 10% allowance 
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required by the contract. In the light of the quoted sec-
tions of the contract the court's action is demonstrative-
ly erroneous. 
The language quoted cle.arly shows a different way 
for considerations of F.H.A. adjustment yet the adjust-
ments are handled exactly the same as the amount of the 
original lump sun1 from the "Lump Sum Contract." 
The Goldberg audit is premised on the idea that the 
adjustments were to be handled in the same manner as 
the lump sum and therefore correction must be made if 
the judgment is to properly resolve the claims of the 
parties. 
Defendants have strenuously resisted any and all 
claims that the amount of the change allowance be added 
to the lump sum. If it were ,added to the amount of the 
mortgage the resulting total was so small that under no 
accounting theory would Locke be entitled to a bonus. 
At no place in the evidence is there any showing that 
Harsh Investment and Harsh Utah ever entered into 
any agree1nent concerning the overtime which Harsh 
Investment paid to employees .at Hill Field. Nothing 
in the record indicates that Harsh Investment was to re-
ceive any additional consideration by reason of having 
to pay overti1ne. At no place is there any agreement that 
it might take rental income from Harsh Utah until the 
allowed construction period was over. It would be a 
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strange practice indeed if a builder who finished a con-
struction project ahead of schedule could rent the project 
and collect income from it until the maximum period al-
lowed for construction had elapsed. 
For plaintiff to establish .a right to have additional 
sums paid by Harsh Utah to Harsh Investment from 
rentals he must rely upon Schnitzer's oral agreement 
on the :Montana job and show that he was after all the 
party who was in control of both Harsh Utah and 
the Harsh Investment and in effect is the real party in 
interest. If he adopts such a position and admits the fact 
that Schnitzer is the real person out of whose pocket 
losses must be paid and into whose pocket any profit will 
flow, then he defeats his own purpose. Admittedly a full 
.and complete accounting reveals that no profit was made 
by Schnitzer. Contrast the way Goldberg attempts to 
handle the contract between Harsh Utah and Harsh In-
vesment with his inconsistent treatment of the profit 
allowed to Pacific Coast Equipment Company on its 
transactions with Harsh Investment. 
It is conceded by plaintiff that if profit must be made 
by Schnitzer, then Locke is :t!Ot entitled to any bonus for 
no profit whatsoever was earned by him. The uncontro-
verted accountings show that only by taking from Schnit-
zer's personal funds a sum of money and arbitrarily de-
nominating it "profit" is it possible to award a judgment 
in favor of Locke. It is respectfully submitted that such 
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action violates every intendment of the parties and is 
contrary to equity and justice which this court should 
administer with even hand. 
At page 66 of plaintiff's brief, he sets forth a con-
tention that this court should ignore the existence of 
Harsh Utah and Harsh Investment whenever that would 
be to the benefit of Locke and set them up and recognize 
their existence whenever to do so would benefit Locke. 
He justifies this claim of on again off again recognition 
of the existence of the separate corporate entity by a 
statement that to permit the existence of the corporations 
would perpetrate a fraud on Locke. Nothing specific 
is alleged at any place concerning any fraud. Apparently 
plaintiff contends that there is fraud in the air and in 
some way he should be .able to receive some benefit from 
it. 
Even in the brief, fraud is just generally alluded to. 
This court by its decisions recognizes that when a fraud 
is claimed, it must be set out in specific detail. Plaintiff 
knows that fraud cannot be claimed by a general non-
specific statement. Desperate men will resort to any de-
vice to gain their ends. 
No place in the evidence, no place in the record and 
no place in the accounting has there ever been any evi-
dence presented that anyone ever attempted to cheat or 
to defraud plaintiff. The evidence is full of the details of 
how plaintiff cheated and defrauded his employer at 
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every turn of the road. He was forgiven and taken back 
into the good graces of the employer. Judgment w.as 
awarded against him for the amounts which the evidence 
demonstrated he had defrauded and misappropriated. 
POINT III. 
THE HILL FIELD WHERRY HOUSING PROJECT WAS 
ADEQUATELY, COMPLETELY AND FULLY FINANCED 
BY HAROLD J. SCHNITZER. 
A basically erroneous conception is advanced and 
put forward by plaintiff concerning the manner in which 
the projects at Hill Field, Great Falls, and at Barstow, 
California, were financed by Schnitzer. There were nu-
merous transfers of funds between the various corpora-
tions which defendant, Schnitzer, owned and was using 
to accomplish the work at Hill Field, Gre.at Falls and 
Barstow. Schnitzer, throughout the construction projects, 
felt free to use his financial resources at whatever point 
the need for those resources arose. As a consequence on 
numerous occasions, funds were used to pay obligations 
at Schnitzer's own bank, obligations for Harsh Invest-
ment, H.arsh Utah, Harsh Construction and Harsh Cali-
fornia. These transfers of funds were made openly and 
were recorded accurately on the books of the corporation 
and were something which was known to Locke. For 
him to deny that he had knowledge of it in the face of the 
fact that he spent one-third of his time in the home office 
where the books and records of the financial transactions 
were handled is unbelievable. But regardless of whether 
Locke knew of the transfer of funds from one of the cor-
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porations to another or to the defendant, Schnitzer, him-
self personally the only basic question is, did any of the 
transfers between Schnitzer, individually, or Harsh In-
vestment or Harsh Utah in any way detrimentally af-
fect the financing and construction of the Harsh Hill 
Field Project. 
No evidence was ever presented that the transfers 
of funds between the various corporations and Mr. 
Schnitzer in any way prevented the proper financing of 
the Hill Field Project. The controller, Ellis, testified 
that the accounts of Harsh Investment were current 
and that the bills of that corporation were paid promptly 
and without any defalcation of any kind (Tr. 1070). The 
accountings prove without any possible contradiction 
that after all of the subcontractors, materialmen and 
parties who had actually participated in the construction 
project had been paid there was still on deposit with 
the court, funds greatly in excess of any just demand on 
either Schnitzer, Harsh Utah or Harsh Investment. 
During the trial, because plaintiff made so much of 
the fact that funds were transferred fron1 the various 
corporations to each other to Schnitzer and from Schnit-
zer back to the various corporations, it was requested 
that the controller of the corporations prepare a state-
ment showing the various transfers and the outcome of 
the financial manipulations which were necessary to pro-
vide adequate finances at each of the projects. The 
compilatjon became Exhibit 195. 
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It shows on page ii (App.) the total amounts received 
by Harsh Utah from the Irving Trust Company which 
includes the personal escrowed funds. The total amounts 
which were paid over to the Harsh Investment by Schnit-
zer or his wholly owned corporations. The document 
shows that there had been received from Irving Trust 
Company up to the time of the trial, a total of $2,752,-
704.00. This total consisted of all payments from the 
proceeds of the mortgage amounting to $2,245,546.00 and 
payments from the escrowed funds in the amount of 
$51:2,158.00. Page ii (App.) shows a breakdown through 
the period of construction of the amounts paid on the Hill 
Field Project costs. The total is $2,747,775.00. The dif-
ference between receipts and expenditures is $4,929.00. 
This small sum in no way effected the financing of the 
Hill Field Project. 
The court records prove beyond any possible dispute 
that funds are still available for the payment of all sub-
contractors, materialmen and others making claims 
against the Harsh Investment and Harsh Utah. The 
deposit with the Davis County Treasurer, is greatly in 
excess of any sum which any person can legitimately 
claim is due them for services rendered or materials 
supplied at the Hill Field Wherry Housing Project. 
No attack was ever made on the accuracy, validity 
and truthfulness of Exhibit 195. It stands in the record 
uncontroverted and uncontradicted. Defendants have 
reproduced the exhibit at pages i and ii of the appendix 
in this brief. 
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The F.H.A. rules and regulations which are quoted 
and set forth in defendant's main brief require of a spon .. 
sor that a completion bond in the amount of ten percent 
of the construction costs be placed with the government 
authorities to insure the adequacy of the funds which the 
sponsor agreed to provide. Such a bond was supplied 
by the Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Company 
and was in the amount of $299,521. The bond is discussed 
at page 90 of defendants' brief. The bond being a com-
pletion bond was an absolute guarantee that the project 
would be completed and the bills and expenses incurred 
paid as they came due. Such bonds require large liquid 
collateral which Schnitzer furnished the bonding com-
pany. With the bond and the large cash deposit there is 
a double guarantee of adequate financing which shows 
beyond question that Schnitzer financed properly and 
adequately the Housing Project. 
It is respectfully subn1itted that the uncontradicted, 
undisputed evidence shows that the Wherry Housing 
Project was completely, fully and adequately financed 
at all states of the construction; that the court's finding 
that it was not properly financed is without support in 
the evidence. Since it was properly financed the court's 
finding that there was no damage resulting to plaintiff 
is correct. 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, defendants would like to state in a few 
paragraphs, the primary considerations before the Su-
preme Court and to bring into focus, if possible, the 
large and material differences between the position of 
plaintiff and defendants. 
(a) The Accounting Information in the Trial Court 
was Premature. 
At the time of the Goldberg audit, at the time of the 
Card Greaves audit, and during all of the trial no final 
and complete accounting could be prepared on the Hous-
ing Project at Hill Field. The project was not closed; 
the .amount of Change Order Extras had not been deter-
mined. A great number of disputes between claimant on 
the project and the Harsh people had not been resolved. 
The exact amounts due to various subcontractors and 
materialmen had not been determined. As a consequence, 
all of the accountings had to be tentative only. At the 
close of the trial, after the closing papers were prepared 
under supervision of the F.H.A., the amounts of Change 
Order Extras determined, and the final judgments en-
tered by the court for the various claimants, then defend-
ants moved the trial court for permission to bring the 
accounting information up-to-date. 
Part of the information offered was the F.H.A. 
project analysis showing the completed project and the 
adjustments in the mortgage figure. Defendants sought 
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to introduce evidence concerning the date of completion 
and the various other documents which finalized the 
project at Hill Field. This motion (R. 159-61) was filed 
on the 28th day of J.anuary, 1955. 
The Court refused to permit the filing as exhibits 
of the documents which finalized the housing project. 
The documents were placed in the record and are now 
before the court even though not admitted as exhibits. 
There was no questioon concerning their accuracy or au-
thenticity nor the fact that they would very materially 
effect the figures which had been used by the court. 
The documents would require .adjustments in the account-
ings which were n1ade while the project was still under 
construction. The actual effect that the closing figures 
had on the project are shown in the appendix to defend-
ants' main brief, as a part of the Peat, Marwick, :Mitchell 
accounting. This accounting it is hoped will assist the 
court .in understanding the effect of v.arious differences 
between the Greaves accounting, the Goldberg accounting 
and the true and accurate figures which are demonstrat-
ed by the record before the court. 
The accountings demonstrate that there can be no 
possible payment of a bonus to Locke. They demonstrate 
that the construction project when considered as .a whole 
and when all of the costs are taken into account did not 
result in a profit to any person. 
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The trial court understood that it would be necessary 
to make adjustment in the accounting figures which were 
received. Locke's case was originally scheduled to follow 
all of the other c.ases which were at issue. To accommo-
date counsel for plaintiff the Locke case was commenced 
at an earlier date and was tried prior to the time that 
there was any determination as to exactly how much was 
due and owing the v.arious subcontractors whose matters 
were in litigation. It was then anticipated that adjust-
ments would be made and would necessarily have to be 
made if the accounts were to show accurately the profits 
and losses on the housing project. These are the anti-
cipated .adjustments which the court refused to permit 
at the close of the case. The rational of such a refusal is 
difficult for defendants to ascertain. It is defendants' 
position that there could be no reason why the accounting 
information should not be brought up to date and the 
accurate figures presented .and used by the trial court as 
a basis for his judgment. 
(b) False claims of profits. 
In Locke's brief, he continually refers to the enor-
mous profit which will be realized by defendants. Those 
profits are entirely fictitious, speculative and uncertain. 
For instance, in his brief, Locke claims that Schnit-
zer will have projects worth seven million dollars in 
Mont.ana and Utah. This statement is entirely false and 
knowingly so. The equity of Schnitzer will be only such 
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sums as he has actually paid as costs for the construr-
tion of the projects. The advancements from the various 
mortgages must be repaid in full and with interest. For 
plaintiff to ignore the tremendous obligations which must 
be liquidated prior to the time Schnitzer can realize .any-
thing out of his capital investments is to attempt to per-
petrate on this court a false and fictitious concept. 
At another point in the brief of plaintiff, he claims 
that defendants will have $30,000.00 of tax free income. 
What he is not stating to this court is that that income 
will be depreciation calculated on the projects. Whether 
or not it is realized will depend on whether or not the 
projects maintain their value and are profitable invest-
ments and whether or not the projects are managed in 
such a way so that returns may be obtained. 
It is a false and fictitious notion that there is any 
assurance that defendants will ever receive any return 
whatsoever on the money invested in the housing project 
or that there will ever be a return of the capital invested 
in said projects. There is no guarantee by any agency 
in the United States Government that the sponsor and 
builder of vVherry Housing Projects shall realize any 
profit at all. The limitations are on the .amounts which 
n1ay be realized. The act requires and provides that there 
shall not be a return in excess of six and one-half percent 
on all the money which has been used for the construction. 
Out of this six and one-half percent must be paid the 
mortgage interest payn1ent and any other interest 
charges. 
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It is recognized by all parties that what Locke and 
Schnitzer had in mind in the construction of the Wherry 
Housing Project was a so-called windfall profit. It was 
to be realized by constructing the housing projects at .a 
cost less than the amount that could be obtained as ad-
vancements on mortgage. 
This so-called windfall profit becomes possible only 
if the efficiency and economy with which the projects 
are constructed exceeds F.H.A. expectations. Estimated 
costs of replacements fixing maximum bids were placed 
on each project by the F .H.A. experts and officials. The 
mortgage was calculated at ninety percent of the bid ac-
cepted by the government. In order for there to be a wind-
fall profit, the sponsor had to construct the project 
for less than ninety percent of the bid which was accept-
ed by the government for the construction of the project. 
There is nothing illegal, unconscionable or inequit-
able about sponsors attempting to make windfall profits 
by the exercise of ingenuity, efficiency .and economy in 
the construction of a Wherry Housing Project. The 
Wherry Housing Act was aimed at interesting in govern-
ment housing construction, private enterprise and private 
builders. The private ·builder would be interested in 
constructing the project only if he could see that to do so 
would net him a profit. The profit, in order to entice the 
builder into government housing when the number of 
tenants is uncertain and dependent upon the amount of 
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defense expenditures, would have to be one which can be 
calculated and .ascertained at the beginning of the con-
struction project. 
Defendants' experience at the Hill Field Wherry 
Housing Project has been very unprofitable. Contrary 
to the speculations that plaintiff makes in his brief, the 
occupancy rate is way down. The mortgage on the project 
has been returned to the Federal Housing Administration 
for handling. It has been necessary for the sponsor to 
obtain from the Federal Government a moratorium for 
the payn1ent of the amounts which are currently due on 
the mortgage balance. 
It has been held that Harsh Investment should be 
permitted to increase its lump sum contract amount by 
fictitious figures as follows : 
(a) Change order extras in the sum of $178,672.00. 
The actual amount received was $154,400.00. The dif-
ference between these two figures being $24,272.00. 
(b) Total receipts to the Harsh Interests was $3,-
173,877.00. The actual total amount received by Harsh 
Utah, Harsh Investment and Harold Schnitzer from the 
mortgage .as it was finally adjusted, is $2,791,200, a dif-
ference of $382,677. 
(c) That rentals collected on the Housing Project 
by Harsh Utah should be added to the amount of the lump 
sum contract. The amount erroneously calculated was 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3') i) 
$165,986.49. The inclusion of this rental income was 
specifically prohibited by the October 4th agreement. 
See page 76 of defendants' brief. 
Profits have been increased by the elimination of 
demonstrated and undisputed expenditures by Harsh in-
terests, such as : 
(a) The payment by Harsh Utah and Schnitzer for 
financing, planning and commencing the Project. The 
amounts thus eliminated were $157,442.76. See appendix, 
main brief, page 15. 
(b) Eliminations of indirect overhead costs as audit-
ed by all of the auditors. The amount eliminated, $120,.-
384.90; amount substituted, $45,631.34; difference, $7 4,-
753.56. 
(c) Eliminations of interest expenses actually in-
curred and paid by Harsh Utah during the construction 
period. Amount, $105,845.39. Total amount of these 
actual demonstrated and undisputed expenditures which 
were eliminated erroneously, $338,041.71, and if said ex-
penditures are allowed, it would eliminate the possibility 
of any bonus whatsoever to the plaintiff. 
Other costs which have been eliminated by the deci-
sion of the trial court, defendants submit, are proper and 
should have been allowed by the trial court but since they 
.are disputed, either in amount or as to whether or not 
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they are proper, they are not included in this summary, 
and only costs which were actual, demonstrated and dis-
puted are included. 
(c) Conclusion 
It is respectfully submitted that if the court does any 
one of the following: (1) properly interprets the Octo-
ber 4th agreement, (2) properly permits the inclusion of 
all actual, demonstrated and undisputed expenses, or (3) 
includes only the proper items of income to Harsh 
Investment then plaintiff would not and could not be 
awarded a bonus. 
• RAWLINGS, WALLACE, 
ROBERTS & BLACK 
DWIGHT L. KING 
Counsel for .Appellants 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
APPENDIX 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
APPENDIX 
Balance 
HIC to 
a;c Pay. Hill Field 
Paid Deduct Costs 
1952 
July ·-----------------------$ 10,784 ........................................ $ 10,784 
August -------------------- 13,501 ........................................... 13,501 
September -------------- 364,890 $ 50;000 314,890 
October ------------·----- 210,465 15,100 195,365 
November --------··---- 186,031 17,000 169,031 
December 
--------------
274,112 113,525 160,587 
1953 
January ------------------ 342,254 151,500 190,754 
February ---------------- 165,259 21,556 143,703 
M.arch ··-------------------- 142,287 20,784 121,503 
April 
---------------·------
227,128 36,500 190,628 
1lay ------------------------ 674,576 333,971 340,605 
June------------------------ 287,685 5,400 282,285 
July------------------------ 255,557 29,886 225,671 
August -------------------- 230,991 50,322 180,669 
September 
------------
86,544 33,415 53,129 
October ------------------ 115,734 53,681 62,053 
November -------------- 12,635 2,042 10,593 
December ............................. 49,200 10,621 38,579 
1954 
January ------------------ 19,242 2,694 16,548 
February---------------- 15,333 6,479 8,854 
March ---------------------- 50,093 32,072 18,021 
April ............................................. 53,978 53,956 22 
$~,788,279 $1,040,504 $2,747,775 
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H-U-C H-I-C 
Rec'd. from Paid to Rec'd. from a;c Pay. 
Irving RIC HUC Paid 
1952 
July ............ $ 47,295 
---------------- ---------------· $ 1 0,78-~ 
August -------- 991 
--------·------- ----------------
13,501 
Sept. -----------· 337,106 336,419 336,419 364,890 
Oct.--·-···------- 221,241 221,991 221,991 210,465 
Nov.-----------· 296,550 235,000 235,000 186,031 
Dec. ... ................................ 85,927 16,000 16,000 274,112 
1953 
Jan. 
------------
261,768 262,700 262,700 342,254 
Feb. 
------------
220,558 700 700 165,259 
March .......... 104,182 
----·---·------- --------------- .. 
142,287 
April ............................ 129,234 129,200 129,200 227,128 
May ............ 400,980 393,000 393,000 674,576 
June ............ 187,958 190,000 190,000 287,685 
July ............ 209,384 207,000 207,000 255,557 
August ........ 184,521 185,400 185,400 230,991 
Sept ............. 65,009 66,000 66,000 86,544 
Oct ............. ........................................... 3,100 3,100 115,734 
Nov ............. ... ....................................... 8,700 8,700 12,635 
Dec.---·-····--· ...................................... 9,000 9,000 49,200 
1954 
Jan. ·----------- ---------------- 5,000 5,000 19,242 
Feb. ------------ ........................................... 6,000 6,000 15,333 
March ........ 
----------------
11,500 11,500 50,093 
April .......... 
--------------·-
11,400 11,400 53,978 
Total 
----------$2,752,704 $2,298,110 $2,298,110 
Mort. Pr. ____ 2,240,546 73,279 73,279 
Escrow-------- 512,158 44,274 44,274 
$2,415,663 $2,415,663 $3,788,279 
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